
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APK 4 . 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Deputy Director (Intelligence)

PROM:

Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT:

SODB 50086

l. In a conversation with Ambassador George Kennan yesterday afternoon I inquired of him whether he had yet been presented with and had an opportunity to comment upon the above-mentioned SODB, as I have been sware of the exceptionally strong interest on the part of the Director, yourself and others in this particular report and in getting Mr. Kennan's comments with respect to it.

- 2. Hr. Kennan replied that he had read the report and had dictated a brief comment on it yesterday. In view of the possibility that Mr. Kennan may have included certain observations in his oral comment to me which do not appear in his written comment, it has seemed worth while to record his statements for your benefit.
- 3. Mr. Kemnam said that he gave a fairly high appraisal to this report but that there are a number of points about it which do not ring true and are not at all convincing. He had seen Mr. Pohlen's appraisal and said that he was perhaps not quite as enthusiastic about the report. He considered that it was probably written by a satellite personality operating on the periphery of the big stuff, but in a position to pick up a lot of informed gossip. He revealed a general unfamiliarity with Communist Party history and personalities in Essaia prior to World War II. This led Mr. Kennam to conclude that the source is a relative newcomer to Communist councils -- a Johnny-come-lately who must have got on the inside not earlier than some time during the war.
- it. Concerning the report itself, it is a mixture of information of the kind gleanable from satellite Communist conversations and some shrewd analysis and guesswork. The personality pictures are not entirely reliable and the altogether too neat division into groups warrants skepticism. Even the headings and the attributed characteristics of the two schools of thought are apt to be misleading, perhaps dangerously so. The source over-reached himself in attributing

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divergencies of views on the part of individual Polithuro members with respect to established decisions of the Polithuro. The members voice their separate views before the decisions are taken, but after decisions have been reached they do not speak against them. Whatever contrary thoughts they may hold these are kept very much to themselves. For example, Molotov is much too cautious an individual to spill his private views to anybody if they were in conflict with established decisions and doctrine. The suggestion that Nuc Tse Tung had been getting two different lines of guidance or instruction from members of the Polithuro is considered by Mr. Kennan as highly unlikely. What has been said and is being said to Mae is of the utmost importance to the Soviet Government and there is little possibility that conflicting instructions are being passed to him.

- 5. On the other hand, there is much in the report that is of great interest and much that is probably correct. Mr. Kennam feels sure that the source put his finger accurately on the real question of analysis that preoccupies the Politburo most, viz. the analysis of what goes on in the capitalist world and whether the economy of capitalism will or will not collapse. There is enough in the report to make it well worth our while continuing to receive material from this source.
- 6. Mr. Kennan would like to see any further material from this seurce, but is reluctant to have it sent in or even brought in by special courier for him to see in Mesoew. The stuff is too hot to risk being sent in and Mr. Kennan was inclined to recommend that we accumulate the best samples of material from this source and our other outstanding pieces and hold them his occasional trips back to the United States or out into Europe. If we should feel at any particular time that we had a sufficient accumulation of material er an item of sufficient importance to warrant it, he would be glad to come out to Berlin or perhaps somewhere in Western Europe to go ever the material with our experts, for the purpose of informing himself and giving us his evaluation.

ASIGNED FRANK O. WISHER

FRANK G. WISHER

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